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Misinformation in social media is an actual and contested policy problem given its outreach
and the variety of stakeholders involved. In particular, increased social media use makes the
spread of misinformation almost universal. Here we demonstrate a framework for evaluating
tools for detecting misinformation using a preference elicitation approach, as well as an
integrated decision analytic process for evaluating desirable features of systems for com-
batting misinformation. The framework was tested in three countries (Austria, Greece, and
Sweden) with three groups of stakeholders (policymakers, journalists, and citizens). Multi-
criteria decision analysis was the methodological basis for the research. The results showed
that participants prioritised information regarding the actors behind the distribution of mis-
information and tracing the life cycle of misinformative posts. Another important criterion
was whether someone intended to delude others, which shows a preference for trust,
accountability, and quality in, for instance, journalism. Also, how misinformation travels is
important. However, all criteria that involved active contributions to dealing with mis-
information were ranked low in importance, which shows that participants may not have felt
personally involved enough in the subject or situation. The results also show differences in
preferences for tools that are influenced by cultural background and that might be considered
in the further development of tools.
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M isinformation in social media is currently attracting alot of attention. Misinformation is not a new phe-nomenon and has probably existed since the dawn of
humanity. Structural evidence of scientific research on mis-
information can be found Allport and Postman’s (1946) basic law
of rumour, which demonstrates that the strength of a rumour is
dependent on the importance of the subject and individual con-
cerns regarding it, as well as the time and ambiguity of the evi-
dence on the topic. New technical capabilities, such as social
media, have naturally made these effects more universal. The
2000s witnessed rapid developments in social media and its
increased outreach to everybody with Internet access. This has
facilitated the spread of information, including misinformation
and rumours, in virtually everything from local neighbourhoods
to global concerns (Del Vicario et al., 2016).
Until recently, there has been limited scientific evidence on
how to deal with misinformation, but research on the topic has
increased rapidly over the past few years. For instance,
researchers have suggested various ways of dealing with citizen
awareness, such as nudging, as a way of vaccinating social
media users against misinformation (Piccolo et al., 2019).
Other topics studied include nudging for accuracy in sharing
on social media (Pennycook et al., 2020) and the limits of
human cognition in dealing with and spreading misinforma-
tion. Finally, researchers have examined a variety of approa-
ches for making fact-checking more efficient, such as
automatic detection of misinformation and correction of data,
while at the same time pointing out the importance of human
fact-checkers, as fully automated fact-checking methods are
not yet strong enough.1
This systemic problem requires stakeholder involvement at
different levels, as misinformation is so widespread and con-
stantly changing. Extensive stakeholder involvement is necessary
for designing policies, methods, and tools. However, existing
approaches to developing online tools tend to follow the tradi-
tional path of dissemination of knowledge from science to sta-
keholders while viewing technology users as passive consumers of
finished products rather than active co-creators. This is particu-
larly alarming today when available anti-misinformation products
and tools are still new to the mass market and hence malleable,
which is rare in the life cycle of a product (Smith and Medin,
1981; Svahn and Lange, 2009). Value-based software engineering
(Boehm, 2003) is an emerging approach that aims to develop
software tools (e.g., the tool by Aurum and Wohlin, 2007) based
on the values and objectives of various stakeholder groups (Biffl
et al., 2006), providing an economic categorisation of the value
concept based on the monetary exchange between a customer and
a provider.
In this study, we investigate two major research questions:
● What are preferences for, perceptions of, and views of the
features of tools for dealing with misinformation?
● How do these preferences depend on the cultural back-
grounds of stakeholder groups and participants?
Our goal is to study the preferences of various stakeholder
groups for features of tools, to study the impact of cultural
background on these preferences, and to develop recommenda-
tions for considering these preferences in the further development
of tools for dealing with misinformation.
The next section provides a background of misinformation and
discusses why we need automatic tools in a general setting. Sec-
tion ‘Methodology' describes the integrated methodology used,
and Section ‘Results' presents the results and a discussion. Finally,
Section ‘Conclusions' concludes the article.
Background
A variety of definitions exist for misinformation, disinformation,
fake news, rumours, and similar terms, and a large number of
them emphasise the distinctions between misinformation and
disinformation, as well as between disinformation and fake news.
A review of the 2016 Presidential election in the United States, for
instance, identified six different types of misinformation:
authentic material used in the wrong context, imposter news sites
designed to look like known brands, fake news sites, fake infor-
mation, manipulated content, and parody content (Wardle,
2016). Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) suggested that mis-
information refers to misleading information created without the
intent to harm, whereas disinformation refers to information
deliberately fabricated with the intent to impact social groups or
societies. Burgoon et al. (2003) discussed misinformation in terms
of deceptive language and false context. Farrel et al. (2018) dis-
tinguished between disinformation and misinformation, con-
sidering both subsets of misinformation: Disinformation largely
involves the intent to deceive, whereas misinformation does not
need to involve intentional deception. Giglietto et al. (2016)
proposed a taxonomy based on perceptions of the source, the
story, and the context and decisions of the audience and the
propagator. In their taxonomy, there is “pure disinformation”
when both the original author and the propagator are aware of
the false nature of information but nevertheless decide to share it.
There is “misinformation propagated through disinformation”
when information is originally produced as true and then shared
by a propagator who thinks it is false. There is also “disin-
formation propagated through misinformation” when informa-
tion is devised as false by a creator but is perceived as true by a
propagator.
Irrespective of such distinctions, both misinformation and
disinformation impact the public debate on issues such as health
and science (e.g., the anti-vaccine movement), foreign policy (e.g.,
the wars in Iraq and Ukraine), migration, elections and so on.
Recognising this, researchers from a variety of disciplines,
including social sciences such as journalism (Ekström et al., 2019)
and psychology (Ecker, 2017), have examined misinformation
and disinformation. The problems of misinformation and disin-
formation are usually called “wicked problems” by design scien-
tists, as no single comprehensive solution is capable of fully
resolving them and attempts to mitigate them often can make
them worse. Some examples of this include the backfire effect
(Nyhan and Reifler, 2010), false misinformation warnings (Freeze
et al., 2020), and the naiveté of social engineering in technology
(Tromble and McGregor, 2019). Misinformation and disin-
formation are also studied with regard to social psychology (e.g.,
people’s values, beliefs, information literacy, and motivations),
regulatory and technical perspectives (social media, detection
tools), and the practice of fact-checking. Given the large volume
of published work we rely here on Vanenzuala et al. (2019), who
conducted a meta-analysis of 650 articles on this topic to identify
regulatory, technical, and normative aspects of misinformation.
Cognitive psychologists have investigated the effectiveness of
corrections and warnings of misinformation for a long time.
Ecker et al. (2010) studied whether the continued influence of
misinformation can be reduced by explicit warnings at the outset
that people may be misled. They found that a specific warning
with detailed information was more efficient than a general
warning reminding people that facts are not always properly
checked. However, a specific warning can reduce reliance on an
outdated source of information but not eliminate it. Pennycook
et al. (2018) investigated how fluency via prior exposure con-
tributes to the believability of fake news. They found that tagging
fake stories as disputed is not an effective solution because it
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simply attracts even more attention to the problem. They also
found that repeating headlines increases perceptions of their
accuracy. Schwarz et al. (2016) found that the myth-versus-fact
article format is not efficient to deal with fake news because such
articles subtly reinforce the myths through repetition and further
increase the spread and acceptance of misinformation. Unfortu-
nately, such articles make misinformation even more easily
accessible by repeating it and illustrating it with pictures. This
increases the probability that misinformation that the commu-
nicator wanted to debunk will continue to be delivered. They
found that it is better to simply provide correct information
rather than try to correct wrong information. They also identified
five criteria that people use to assess the accuracy of information:
acceptance by others, amount of supporting evidence, compat-
ibility with one’s own beliefs, general coherence of the statement,
and credibility of the information source. Lerman (2016) stated
that the interplay between humans’ cognitive limits and the social
media network structure influences the spread of information.
Finally, Chan et al. (2017) found that debunking messages for the
correction of misinformation only increases the effects of the
misinformation.
Misinformation and tools for mitigating it. Several tools have
been developed to counter misinformation, such as Botometer,
Foller.me, TinEye, Insigna, Rbutr, Fakespot, NewsGuard, Greek
Hoaxes Detector, DejaVu and Social Sensor.
● Botometer detects social bots and classifies online social
media user accounts as either bots or human beings. This
classification is based on various features of the user account
profile, online social network structures, historical patterns of
activity, and language and sentiments (Yang et al., 2019;
Botometer tool, 2019).
● Foller.me analyses the profiles and tweets of social network
users and shows various user characteristics, for example,
general information such as name, location, language, join
date, and time zone; statistics about tweets (number of tweets,
followers, following); and tweet analysis (tweet replies,
retweets, tweets with links). The main idea is to understand
the detailed profiles of social media users to verify social media
content (Sloan and Quan-Haase, 2016; Foller.Me tool, 2019).
● TinEye analyses user-generated content, like photos and
videos, as well as detects whether an image, audio content,
or video content is fake (Middleton, 2017; Tineye Tool, 2019).
Members of the global community, in particular journalists,
use this tool and others, such as FotoForensics and Google
Reverse Image, to examine user-generated content.
● Rbutr is a machine-learning algorithm applied to community
feedback to capture webpages with disputed, rebutted, or
contradicted parts elsewhere on the Internet. This tool also
provides sector-wise (e.g., health, education, immigrant,
climate change) repositories of news and community rebuttal
(Mensio and Alani, 2019) and provides warning messages
(e.g., “This is potentially malicious”) for particular news
webpages with a bad reputation.
● Fakespot is a browser plugin that assesses the validity of online
reviews based on their URL (Mensio and Alani, 2019;
Fakespot Analyzer Tool, 2019).
● NewsGuard is another browser plugin that integrates the
opinions of a large pool of journalists and informs users about
the reliability of news websites and organisations. It uses nine
journalist credibility and transparency criteria that are
combined into labels (NewsGuard Tool, 2019).
● Greek Hoaxes Detector is a browser plugin that analyses news
articles and assigns labels such as “scam,” “hoax” or “fake”
(Ellinika Hoaxes Tool, 2019).
● DejaVu is a system for detecting visual misinformation in the
form of image manipulation aimed for use by journalists
(Matatov et al., 2018).
● Social Sensor is a software that gathers social media data and
analyses trends and what influences them (Schifferes et al.,
2014).
The aforementioned tools were designed for particular
purposes and are limited in several respects, such as the following:
1. Requirements for participation: Some tools were developed
based on stakeholder feedback. However, the developers did
not involve end users in the process of developing the tools.
They also did not collect end users’ preferences regarding
these tools. When stakeholders were involved, it was
frequently only one group of stakeholders or a very narrow
circle of professionals who deal with misinformation. This
has resulted in a narrow focus on professional intent
instead of on how consumers of information can reduce
their uptake of misinformation.
2. Technical issues: Almost all of these browser plugins
support only Google Chrome.
3. Lack of integration of the views of fact-checkers: Fact-
checkers are part of a growing community that plays an
essential role in media policies. However, several of these
tools were developed without any consideration from this
community, which has led to unnecessarily incomplete
detection mechanisms.
Consequently, the full potential of fact-checking services has
not been fully realised, and the lack of transparency in
development and input parameters makes them unclear. This
has led to decreased user trust, which is why it seems reasonable
to evaluate the functionality of existing fact-checking tools to
identify possible gaps. This is best done in a collaborative
environment with a high degree of involvement by relevant
stakeholders (Horne et al., 2019).
A few studies have focussed on assessing the perceived needs of
journalists navigating misinformation. In Schifferes et al. (2014),
22 journalists participated in an interview regarding the
functionalities most relevant for tools countering online mis-
information. According to this study, journalists emphasise the
need to predict breaking news and verify content on social media
as true or false. Brandtzaeg et al. (2018) conducted a study with
32 journalists and social media users on perceptions of fact-
checking tools, concluding that users must be able to understand
the limitations of tools and that tools need to be transparent on
all ends, including in terms of funding. To the best of our
knowledge, policymakers have not yet been included in such
studies, although it is clear that policies desire the delivery of tools
for dealing with misinformation.
Participatory governance and value-based software engineer-
ing. Several scientific works have discussed the need to under-
stand the typology and features of misinformation (Rossi and
Lenzini, 2020; Koulolias et al., 2018). The design and evaluation
process we argue for in this article involves two components: (a)
co-creation by users and elicitation of user preferences and (b)
adequate aggregation and evaluation mechanisms. By “co-crea-
tion,” we mean a process that is aligned with Peters and Heraud
(2015) and Gummesson et al. (2014) as an adaptive and inclusive
approach to participatory governance based on the engagement
and involvement of various stakeholder groups. Participatory
governance, which is embodied in processes that empower citi-
zens to participate in public decision making, has been gaining
acceptance as an effective means of tackling democratic deficits
and improving public accountability.
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Participatory governance and co-production processes require
an understanding of human factors such as individual patterns of
decision-making processes, as well as cognitive and behavioural
biases; institutional structures; perceptions of the risks, benefits,
and costs of various policy interventions; as well as a need for
compromise-oriented solutions to honour diverse views and a
variety of voices.
Participatory governance also requires the involvement of
various stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement in decision-
making processes and in the development of tools and decision
support systems is essential for meeting stakeholder requirements
(cf. Komendantova et al., 2014). Furthermore, authors such as
Kujala and Väänänem-Vainio-Mattila (2009) have shown that it
is essential to consider stakeholders’ values regarding the
functionalities and features of a tool when designing new
software and that tools so designed are more likely to be used
by the groups in question.
To achieve this, a number of techniques may be used. Khari
and Kumar (2013) tested common approaches experimentally
with stakeholders, concluding that value-oriented prioritisation
(VOP) met the demands and the environment of the stakeholders
better than other techniques. VOP, a so-called preference-based
approach that relies on techniques and models from the field of
decision analysis, aims to elicit users’ values by studying their
preferences (see Vetschera, 2006, for an introduction in the
context of software engineering). Basic VOP is a scoring-based
additive weighting approach in which a stakeholder or prospec-
tive user ranks features (or requirements) according to his or her
value-in-use (see Azar et al., 2007). If there is more than one user
or stakeholder, the VOP process turns into a group decision
problem (i.e., gathering preferential data from several stake-
holders or prospective users to identify a selection of features that
provides maximum value to users while respecting the resources
of the development team). However, VOP in itself is not flexible
enough to handle ranking statements and aggregate preferences
from several stakeholders in an elaborated way. For this purpose,
there exist the novel methods from the field of decision analysis
described in the following section.
Methodology
The empirical data in this study were collected during a co-
creation process with stakeholder groups that used workshops
and interviews to extract design components from stakeholder
dialogues and findings. The aim was to provide insights into
expected requirements for anti-disinformation tools. A specially
adapted multi-criteria decision framework (Danielson et al.,
2020) was then used to understand the desirability of various
system features of a tool for mitigating misinformation.
Workshop setup and participants. The co-creation workshops
consisted of stakeholders from three groups (journalists/fact-
checkers, policymakers and citizens) in three countries (Austria,
Greece and Sweden). The purpose of the workshops was to dis-
cuss misinformation and, over several sessions, collect percep-
tions of misinformation, test and discuss tools that address
misinformation, as well as various features of these tools. Fur-
thermore, we explored how information about particular online
tools can be transferred to stimulate critical thinking and trust, as
the latter is an important parameter in software adoption (Wu
et al., 2011).
We used the following sampling and invitation process. After
thorough desktop research, a list of organisations was created that
identified the most important stakeholders on the topic. A final
contact list of various organisations representing our three
stakeholder groups (policymakers, citizens, and journalists)
was prepared. Hosting pilot team members were assigned to
contact the organisations and to update the list accordingly.
Subsequently, formal letters of invitation were issued to the target
participants. The letter included a brief description of the Co-
Inform program and the workshop objectives. It also included the
workshop agenda (Appendix II). The team followed up with
phone calls to the identified stakeholders and personally
explained to them the goals of the project, the workshop
methodology, and the importance of their participation. Two
days before the event, a reminder e-mail was sent to the list of
confirmed participants that provided them with more informa-
tion about the location of the event.
The formats of the workshops, as well as the sampling and
invitation processes, were identical for all three countries to
exclude the possibility that the results were influenced by
differences in sampling process or format.
The policymaker group consisted of government organisations
(Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health),
nongovernmental organisations (Solidarity Now, Danish Refugee
Council, UNHCR and others), grassroots organisations (domain
expert organisations like Velos Youth Center), and municipality
services organisations (organisations that provided aid to
refugees, like Greek Refugee Council, could help us recruit
refugees). The citizen group consisted of people from local
communities, people from civil societies, refugees, migrants, as
well as academics. The journalist group consisted of people from
news agencies, radio, and television.
The first co-creation workshop took place in September 2018
in Tokyo, Japan, and was organised by the International Council
for Information Technology in Government Administration and
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). The 103 participants at the first multi-stakeholder
workshop included 11 government chief information officers, 65
high-ranking public officials, 8 journalists, 8 executives of
international organisations, 9 executives from the private sector,
and 2 policymakers. The purpose of the workshop was to assess
the effects of misinformation in society and suggest mitigation
strategies for the public sector.
The second co-creation workshop was portioned among the
three countries and took place in February–March 2019. The
purpose of this workshop was to assess the initial needs of
participants around misinformation, their level of trust in news
sources, and their perceptions of misinformation and to collect
their recommendations on possible interventions and policies. In
Vienna, the Co-Inform workshop was organised in cooperation
with the Ministry of Economy and Digitalization and included 21
policymaker, journalist, and citizen stakeholders, including
representatives of the Austrian Chamber of Labour, the Housing
Service of the Municipality of Vienna, and the Austrian
Association of Cities and Towns. In Sweden, it included 16
participants, of whom four were journalists, five policymakers
(mainly from the Social Democratic Party), and seven citizens
(including from Anti-Rumour Sweden). It was hosted by the
Botkyrka Multicultural Centre. In Greece, the workshop took
place in the community of Serafeio with 31 participants (9
journalists, 9 policymakers, and 13 citizens), including represen-
tatives of the Ministries of Finance, Digital Policy, Health,
Immigration and Education.
The third co-creation workshop took place in these same
countries in November 2019. The major theme of the third Co-
Inform workshop was “Which features make people engage with
misinformation-combatting tools, and why?” The theme was
addressed over a series of five sessions: introduction to the overall
workshop process, categorisation theory exercise, assessment of
features of the interface of a potential tool, Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis (MCDA) sessions, and repertoire grid-nudging
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focus group sessions. Altogether 15 participants attended the
third Co-Inform workshop in Sweden: 3 journalists, 1 policy-
maker, and 11 citizens. In Greece, 19 people participated: six
citizens, seven journalists, and six policymakers. In Austria,
16 stakeholders attended the workshop: five citizens, six journal-
ists, and five policymakers.
The only difference among the aforementioned workshops was
that the participants belonged to three different cultures:
● Workshop 2 (as per our article): We recruited participants
from all stakeholder groups (citizens, journalists, policy-
makers) who were related to organisations that worked with
migrants.
● Workshop 3 (as per our article): We recruited participants
from all stakeholder groups (citizens, journalists, policy-
makers) without focussing on any specific domain.
The format, agenda, and master plan of the workshops were as
follows. All pilot countries (Greece, Austria and Sweden) followed
a common format that included an agenda, templates, survey
forms, exercises, and workshop sessions based on a common
master plan that was prepared by the responsible Co-Inform
project partners in consultation with Co-Inform project technical
partners. Each workshop followed the same master plan. In
addition, discussions were held in all three Co-Inform pilot
countries on common topics as per the master plans of the
workshops.
A main objective of the third workshop was to collect input on
perceptions of functionalities, user experience features, and
system features of tools that deal with misinformation in social
media. Four sessions were conducted during each workshop.
During the first session, the participants were presented with
features. This was followed by a detailed discussion of each
feature and the collection of feedback on what should be included
or added. The following features were subject to evaluation by the
participants:
● Feature 1 (Awareness): I am aware of existing misinformation
online.
● Feature 2 (Why and when): I want to know why a claim has
been flagged as misinformative. And I want to know who
flagged it and when.
● Feature 3a (How it spreads and by whom): I come across
something that I find misinformative. I would like to know
how this information has spread online and who has
shared it.
● Feature 3b (Life cycle [timeline]): I want to know the life cycle
(timeline) of a misinformative post/article (e.g., when it was
first published, how many fact-checkers have debunked it,
and when it was shared again).
● Feature 4a (Sharing over time): I want to be able to quickly
understand how much misinformation people have shared
over time through an overall misinformation score.
● Feature 4b (How misinformative an item is): I want to be able
to quickly understand how much misinformation a news item
or tweet may contain through the provision of an overall
misinformation score.
● Feature 5a (Instant feedback on arrival): When I encounter a
tweet from someone else that contains misinformative
content, I want to be informed that it is misinformative.
● Feature 5b (Inform on consistent accounts): I want the Co-
Inform system to inform me of which accounts (within my
network) consistently generate/share/create misinformative
content.
● Feature 5c (Self-notification): I want the Co-Inform tools to
notify me whenever I repeatedly share misinformation.
● Feature 6 (Credibility indicators): I want to see credibility
indicators that I will immediately understand, and I want the
credibility indicators to look very familiar, like other
indicators online.
● Feature 8 (Post support or refute): I want to be able to post
links to reputable articles and data that support or refute the
story or claim.
● Feature 9 (Tag veracity): I want to be able to tag the veracity
of an element (tweet, story, image, or sentence/claim) in the
current tab I am seeing.
● Feature 10 (Platform feedback): I want to be able to receive
feedback on what the platform is doing and has done with the
tags and evidence I have submitted.
The participants then ranked the features under three criteria,
creating three different rankings of the features, one for each
criterion. The three criteria were as follows:
● Trust: for trust in this tool
● Critical thinking: for making me think twice before I trust
and/or share
● Transparency: for transparency in how the tool makes
judgements
Thereafter, they ranked the three criteria with respect to their
relative importance based on question on the form: “The top-
ranked features under Trust, do they provide more or less value
for you compared to the top-ranked features under Critical
thinking?” If the answer was “yes,” then trust was ranked above
critical thinking (i.e., it was deemed to be of more relative
importance, because the participant perceived greater value if the
top-ranked features for trust were available compared to the top-
ranked features for critical thinking).
Elicitation and evaluation. Danielson et al.’s (2020) decision
analytic framework was used as the rank-based elicitation and
evaluation method. The method was implemented in DecideIT
3.1, which was also used in the workshops. Briefly, DecideIT is
capable of operating with incomplete or numerically imprecise
input data, such as rankings and interval value statements, in a
combined model. To represent the ranking statements, we used a
cardinal ranking approach (P-CAR). P-CAR is a calibrated
method of creating feasible input in the form of surrogate
imprecise value statements, which are derived from rankings
provided by stakeholders. The feasible information is represented
in the form of linear inequalities (greater than) in combination
with interval bounds and a focal point that represents the most
feasible surrogate value for a given element given its position in
the ranking. This enables conventional multi-attribute value
aggregation (Dyer and Sarin, 1979) so the results can be evaluated
across multiple stakeholders and criteria. See Danielson and
Ekenberg (2019) for details on P-CAR.
The evaluation method originated from earlier work on
evaluating decision situations involving numerically imprecise
input. To avoid problems with aggregation when handling set
membership functions and similar features, higher order
distributions for better discrimination between the possible
outcomes are introduced. To alleviate the problem of overlapping
results, the methodology also contains a new evaluation method
based on the resulting belief mass over the output intervals,
without introducing further complicating aspects into the
decision model. During the process, consideration is given to
the entire range of output values, as well as how plausible it is that
a specific feature will outrank the remaining ones, thus providing
a robustness measure. In this way, DecideIT can evaluate the
actual proportion of aggregated values for which a feature is
considered more favourable than another, that is, whether there is
a significantly larger amount of the feasible information (i.e., in
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the set of rankings provided by the participants where one feature
is deemed to provide more value compared to another feature).
This can be seen more concretely in Fig. 1, which shows the
proportion of feasible information (e.g., Feature 2 is deemed to be
more valuable than the rest, Features 3a and 3b are basically equal
and more valuable than Feature 4 and the remaining features).
See Danielson et al. (2020) for a detailed description of the tool
and its underlying theory and Larsson et al. (2018) for details on
aggregation across multiple stakeholders/participants.
Results
In line with OECD’s Recommendation on Digital Government
Strategies, the findings from the first co-creation workshop in
Tokyo emphasised the need for open, inclusive, accountable, and
transparent processes by national governments and highlighted
the fact that digital transformation in the public sector, as well as
increasing accessibility of the Internet, has exacerbated various
problems related to misinformation. Given the importance of
factual information for combatting misinformation in the public
arena, governments need to collaborate with stakeholders and
invest in innovative ways of dealing with misinformation. A
number of specific actions were proposed to deal with this societal
challenge. Empowerment of citizens, encouraged engagement,
education, moderate legislative action, as well as investment in
new technologies are invaluable means of tackling misinforma-
tion. For fragmented technological and innovative solutions to
succeed in tackling misinformation on a broad scale, they need to
be integrated and embedded into a co-creational system of poli-
cies. More collaborative and effective management of mis-
information needs to be supplemented with informed behaviours
among citizens. Creating a trusted environment for citizens with
adequate education is necessary as we enter an era in which big
technological advances have the potential to disrupt even more
than they already have.
The subsequent workshops took place in three different loca-
tions on two separate occasions and provided cross-cultural data
for comparing the needs of various stakeholder groups related to
decision support models. Data were collected, and the needs of
citizens, policymakers, and journalists were identified. Table 1
shows that the need for collaboration and facilitation of tools was
identified in all three case countries and by all three stakeholder
groups. The need for tools to address education and awareness
raising was also identified in all three countries and across all
three groups of stakeholders. These tools are also required for
sharing reliable information. However, an automatic correction
Fig. 1 Results for all groups of stakeholders. Preferences.
Table 1 Major preferences of various stakeholders regarding how to address misinformation in the three case countries
(Sweden, Greece and Austria).
Major preference Citizens Policymakers Journalists
The main goal of misinformation (political, societal) should be tracked +++ + ++
Internet and social media, as well as the mass production of information, are factors that help the spread of
fake news
++ + ++
Need for education and relevant tools +++ ++ +++
Provision of references for validation of information + + +
Tools that give indications and extra information on an article are needed + +++ +
Tools that help in sharing are needed + ++ +
Collaboration among all is needed through facilitating tools +++ +++ +++
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mechanism for validating information was identified as the least
desired option.
These preferences were identified during roundtable discus-
sions in the workshops. Discussions followed the same protocol
in all three countries: Topics for discussion were provided, but
preferences were not identified in advance. The major preferences
were identified based on a review of the transcripts of these
discussions and on the frequency of mention of certain topics.
A rather passive attitude. The results for all groups of stake-
holders and all three countries showed interest in the spread of
misinformation but revealed a rather passive attitude toward
dealing with misinformation. The three most popular answers
across all groups of participants were the following:
● Feature 2 (Why and when): I want to know why a claim has
been flagged as misinformative. And I want to know who
flagged it and when.
● Feature 3a (How it spreads and by whom): I come across
something that I find misinformative. I would like to know
how this information has spread online and who has
shared it.
● Feature 3b (Life cycle [timeline]): I want to know the life cycle
(timeline) of a misinformative post/article (e.g., when it was
first published, how many fact-checkers have debunked it,
and when it was shared again).
A general observation was thus that the participants wanted to
know who spread the misinformation, why, and how, as well as
the timeline of the spread. However, although they wanted to be
informed, they did not feel motivated to take further action. This
is a rather passive way of dealing with misinformation in general.
The participants wanted to be informed when an item was
misinformative, but they did not prioritise dealing with the
general topic of misinformation, actively reporting and correcting
information, or being informed if they themselves were sharing
misinformation.2
Figure 1 aggregates the results from all stakeholder groups in
all three countries. The problem is a multi-stakeholder multi-
criteria decision problem that is evaluated as a multi-linear
problem given the background information. This means that the
weighted averages of the values of the respective features are
evaluated balanced by weights derived from the criteria rankings
above (i.e., equations of the format E(Fj)= Σwivij, where wi is the
weight of criterion i and vij is the value of feature Fj under
criterion i). The value E(Fj) is computed by solving successive
optimisation problems in the program DecideIT (cf., e.g.,
Danielson and Ekenberg, 2019). Briefly, the higher the bar for a
feature, the better that feature is. The respective portions (blue,
light grey and dark grey) show the impact of the respective
criteria. Furthermore, the coloured squares show the robustness
of the results. Green indicates a significant difference between
features, which means that there must be substantial changes in
the input data for a feature to change. Orange indicates a
difference that is more sensitive to the input data. Black indicates
that there is basically no difference between the features.3 For
instance, from Fig. 1, we can see that Feature 2 (Why and when) is
deemed more valuable than the rest. We can also see from the
green square that this result is quite robust.
From the figure, we see that Features 3a and 3b are basically
equal (black square) but preferred over Feature 4 (yellow square)
and the remaining features. Some answers indicating a more
active position, such as Feature 5c (Self-notification): “I want the
Co-Inform tools to notify me whenever I repeatedly share
misinformation” and Feature 6 (Credibility indicators): “I want to
see credibility indicators that I will immediately understand, and I
want the credibility indicators to look very familiar, like other
indicators online,” were ranked at the bottom.
Citizens. Table 2 shows the main differences in citizens’ attitudes
in the case countries. Heterogeneity regarding the best technology
features can be observed.
In particular, the most preferred option for the citizens from
Vienna was as follows:
● Feature 6 (Credibility indicators): I want to see credibility
indicators that I will immediately understand, and I want the
credibility indicators to look very familiar, like other
indicators online.
This is somewhat surprising, as this feature ranked quite low
in the joint results for all three countries and all three groups
of stakeholders (see Fig. 1) and was ranked lowest in the
Athens workshop. There seemed to be quite a strong
polarisation regarding this feature. In contrast, Stockholm
and Athens had equal preferences for Features 3b and 4a.
● Feature 3b (Life cycle [timeline]): I want to know the life
cycle (timeline) of a misinformative post/article (e.g.,
when it was first published, how many fact-checkers
have debunked it, and when it was shared again).
● Feature 4a (Sharing over time): I want to be able to
quickly understand how much misinformation people
have shared over time through an overall
misinformation score.
Athens and Vienna had the lowest scores on Feature 5a
(Instant feedback on arrival): “When I encounter a tweet from
Table 2 Citizen preferences in Vienna, Stockholm and Athens.
Country Major Minor Comparison
Vienna Credibility indicators
Awareness
Instant feedback on arrival
Post support or refute
How misinformative an item is
Had a lower score on platform feedback, life cycle (timeline), and sharing
over time than in Stockholm and Athens
Stockholm Why and when








Had a lower score on tag veracity than in Vienna and Athens





Instant feedback on arrival
Credibility indicators
Had a lower score on why and when than in Vienna and Stockholm
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someone else that contains misinformative content, I want to be
informed that it is misinformative.” Fig. 2 aggregates citizens’
preferences in the three countries (equally weighted).
We can see that Features 3b and 9 are the most (and equally
preferred) features when data from the three countries are
aggregated, followed by Feature 2. There was thus no clear
distinction between the two highest ranked options.
Journalists. An overview of journalists’ preferences in the
respective countries is shown in Table 3.
The highest ranked features for the journalist group were as
follows:
● Feature 2 (Why and when): I want to know why a claim has
been flagged as misinformative. And I want to know who
flagged it and when.
● Feature 3a (How it spreads and by whom): I come across
something that I find misinformative. I would like to know
how this information has spread online and who has
shared it.
These two options were also the best choices in Stockholm and
Athens and (consequently) corresponded well with the average
for all groups and all three case countries (see Fig. 1). Another
difference between journalists in Vienna and journalists in the
two other case countries was that the highest ranked features in
Vienna were the lowest ranked ones in Athens and Stockholm.
Figure 3 aggregates journalists’ preferences in the three countries
(equally weighted).
Policymakers. There were no results for policymakers in Stock-
holm because only one policymaker participated and did not
make any choices for the analysis. Table 4 shows the two most
prioritised features of the policymakers in Greece and Austria.
We can see that the most preferred features were the following:
Fig. 2 Citizen preferences in Sweden, Greece and Austria. Preferences.
Table 3 Journalist preferences in Vienna, Stockholm and Athens.
Country Major Minor Comparison





Post support or refute
Tag veracity
Vienna had lower preferences than Athens and Stockholm for why and when,
how it spreads and by whom, and life cycle and higher preferences for how
misinformative an item is, self-notification and credibility indicators
Stockholm Why and when






Stockholm had lower preferences for how misinformative an item is and
credibility indicators
Athens Why and when




Instant feedback on arrival
Self-notification
Athens had lower preferences for instant feedback on arrival and self-
notification
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● Feature 2 (Why and when): I want to know why a claim has
been flagged as misinformative. And I want to know who
flagged it and when.
● Feature 4a (Sharing over time): I want to be able to quickly
understand how much misinformation people have shared
over time through an overall misinformation score.
Figure 4 aggregates policymakers’ preferences in the two
countries (equally weighted).
Differences by country. There were some significant differences
among the joint stakeholder groups in the different countries. As
can be seen from Table 5, the stakeholder groups in Austria
preferred credibility indicators. In Greece, the stakeholder groups
preferred life cycle (timeline) features. In Sweden, the stakeholder
groups preferred the why and when feature, as well as the how it
spreads and by whom feature.
It was beyond the scope of this study to understand why these
differences appeared and how cultural background influenced
them. However, it would be interesting for further research to
identify the impacts of various cultural factors, such as values,
history of participation in each country, and others, on
preferences for features of tools for mitigating misinformation
in various countries. Therefore, we recommend that developers of
tools consider differences in preferences regarding tools that are
influenced by cultural background.
In sum, there were a variety of preferences for necessary
features of tools for mitigating misinformation, and they seemed
to be correlated with cultural background rather than with
stakeholder group. That is, it seems that cultural context plays a
large role in these preferences (and thus the intended specific use
of the tools). An important conclusion from this (albeit limited)
study is that tools for mitigating misinformation must be flexible
enough because it will probably be hard to produce a global (or
context-independent) tool that balances all desirable features in
such a way as to appeal to a general global public.
Conclusions
There is a need for comprehensive solutions for designing tools
for mitigating misinformation from a value-based software
engineering perspective. Here, we demonstrated a framework for
evaluating tools for detecting misinformation using a preference
elicitation approach, as well as an integrated decision analytic
process for evaluating desirable features of systems for combat-
ting misinformation. The framework was tested in workshop
settings in Athens, Vienna and Stockholm, where a decision
analytic methodology was used to address three interdependent
factors:
● Elicitation: There are significant difficulties with eliciting
preferences, in particular in group decision making and
negotiations. We therefore constructed a process based on
preference rankings and negotiations, as well as algorithms
for aggregating the results.
● Evaluation: In general, decision analytic evaluation methods
are inflexible in relation to the complex nature of decision
problems, and it is usually difficult to aggregate information.
Furthermore, there is little or no constructive feedback from
evaluation methods. Our process enables more interactive use
of group rankings and possibilities to see the effects of
conflicting opinions and how they affect the final results. If
the results are not robust (because opinions conflict too
much), negotiation can begin again until there is agreement
Fig. 3 Journalists preferences in Vienna, Stockholm and Athens. Preferences.
Table 4 Policymaker preferences in Vienna and Athens.
Country Major Minor
Athens Life cycle (timeline)
Why and when
Credibility indicators
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or at least clarification where there are essential conflicts.
● Communication: A key aspect of exploiting decision analytic
support is facilitating communication of the result and of the
perspectives of the members of a group. Here we suggest a
workshop format with stakeholder representatives. This is,
however, not a required format, and the same basic ideas can
be used in a more distributed manner, where direct
interaction can be combined with the use of questionnaires
and feedback mechanisms for respondents.
In our case study, the participants prioritised information
regarding the actors behind the distribution of misinformation
and tracing the life cycle of misinformative posts. The fact that it
mattered to participants whether someone intended to delude
others indicates the participants’ preference for trust, account-
ability, and quality in, for instance, journalism.
Furthermore, the three most valued features across all parti-
cipants related to the timing and travel of misinformation (when,
spread, life cycle), which indicates the significance the partici-
pants attributed to the chain of transmission by which a story
reached the user. How misinformation travels thus seems to be
important for the participants’ assessment of the veracity of a
claim. With Allport and Postman’s (1946) basic law of rumour in
mind, participants were interested in shining a light on one of the
two critical prerequisites to rumour: They expressed a strong
desire to achieve a clearer understanding of what was going on in
the case of ambiguous facts or evidence. However, because fea-
tures requiring active contribution were low ranked, the partici-
pants may not have felt personally involved enough in the subject
or situation in which there was a need for rebuttal and clarity.
The three most valued features can be assessed using the four-
question truth assessment people undertake when evaluating a
statement (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). All three features partially
contribute to answering the second question of the assessment:
“Is the story coherent?” Participants were interested in mon-
itoring the spread of a story, expressing a desire to fill in gaps that
a refutation may have left behind, as one piece of information
cannot be assessed in isolation. Features 2 and 3a resort to pin-
pointing the communicator (“who flagged it,” “who has shared
it”), attending to the third question: “Is the information from a
credible source?” To process the information, participants turned
to verifying the communicator’s credibility. The fourth question,
“Do others believe this information?”, is inherent in Feature 3b, in
which importance is attributed to how many fact-checkers have
debunked a story. The number of fact-checkers may therefore
create the perception of a strong consensus, which participants
may use to counterbalance an erroneous perceived social con-
sensus. No wireframe responds to the first question, “Is the
information compatible with what I believe?”, as capturing belief
structures was outside the scope of our study.
Fig. 4 Policymakers preferences in Vienna and Athens. Preferences.
Table 5 Preferences of the three stakeholder groups in Austria, Greece and Sweden.
Stakeholder group Austria Greece Sweden
Citizens Credibility indicators, awareness Life cycle (timeline), sharing over
time, tag veracity, platform feedback
Why and when, how it spreads and by whom,
life cycle (timeline), sharing over time, inform
on consistent accounts
Journalists How misinformative an item is,
awareness, self-notification, credibility
indicators
Why and when, how it spreads and
by whom, life cycle (timeline),
platform feedback
Why and when, how it spreads and by whom,
life cycle (timeline)
Policymakers Why and when, awareness, credibility
indicators, sharing over time
Life cycle (timeline), why and when
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In the third Co-Inform co-creation workshop, we intended to
determine the most preferred of the aforementioned 13 features
among the stakeholders (citizens, journalists, and policymakers)
in the Co-Inform project pilot countries (Greece, Sweden, and
Austria). We thoroughly explain stakeholders’ preferences for
these features in Section ‘Results'. However, we did not specifi-
cally gather participants’ preferences for features of existing tools.
During this workshop and discussions with participants, we
observed that they desired that the Co-Inform project include the
key features of existing misinformation tools. Existing tools, along
with feature(s) preferred by the stakeholders, include the
following:
Rbutr: includes sector-wise repositories of news and commu-
nity rebuttal and feedback from the community about a news
item or a tweet.
Foller.me and Botometer: provide generic information about
social network users to help users know who shared information.
Fakespot: includes assessment/analysis of reviews about a news
item or article.
NewsGuard: enables users to provide opinions along with
supporting material about the authenticity of a news item or a
tweet, informs users how reliable a news item or tweet is, and
provides credibility statistics about a news item or a tweet.
Greek Hoaxes Detector: analyses news items or tweets and
assigns them a label so that users can see whether they are
misinformative.
The participants strongly prioritised these features over those
requiring an active contribution to rebutting a story or claim.
These observations thus indicate that automated tool support for
reliable information detection, tools that support active reasoning,
and training in becoming attuned to misinformation strategies
(Roozenbeek and van der Linden, 2019) are of high importance.
Future studies could further explore the reasons why people
engage in a cognitive process of increasing links between nodes
for coherence while taking a backseat when tasked with correcting
misinformation. This would yield insights into whether and when
a push or stimulus may be required when designing novel
crowdsourced verification tools.
A main observation is that detection tools by themselves can-
not combat misinformation; they must be complemented by
other means. Automated solutions must work in a context of
general societal awareness in combination with the detection
mechanisms we investigated in this study. First, as our results
indicate, no tool support is likely able to address all user pre-
ferences, which is why tools must be complemented by general
awareness. There is thus a need to integrate automated systems
with broad public information campaigns, including quick tips
for citizens on how to conduct research online by themselves on
news articles whose content seems to be dubious. Second, our
results indicate that journalists take a rather passive approach to
detecting misinformation; there is thus a need to increase
awareness of the need for more active detection of misinforma-
tion. This can be done by, for instance, organising media and
news literacy workshops that bring together, inter alia, fact-
checkers and interested citizens with journalists. Third, because
even the most sophisticated automatic tools cannot address the
entire range of trust issues and preference structures for evalu-
ating them, there is also a need for reinforced legislation to
increase transparency among technology companies concerning
the use of data and the origin of information. Fourth, there is a
need to create diverse and cross-sectorial teams whose tasks are to
spot misinformation and to warn the public by providing clear
explanations. Finally, media and news literacy classes should be
introduced into the school curriculum in parallel with, for
instance, topics on information technology (e.g., Koulolias et al.,
2018).
Although the first workshop had a global scope, the second and
third ones were conducted in Europe. Within Europe, three dif-
ferent geographic locations were chosen (north, middle, south)
with cultures that differ in both governance and social media.
Although it is impossible to include every country, the sample set
constituted good coverage of European countries. Thus, it seems
feasible to generalise the findings to Europe as a whole. Because
the first workshop focussed more on assessing the effects of
misinformation in society, it provided an overview of the scope of
the problem in different countries. It did not, however, yield data
for classifying the extent of misinformation according to social
media maturity, state constitution, or political traditions. Thus,
beyond being generalised to Europe, our findings also form a
relevant and important basis for conducting similar studies in
other parts of the world.
Data availability
For individual privacy reasons data which were collected from
stakeholders elicitations and preferences cannot be made avail-
able in the public repository.
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Notes
1 See, for example, www.coinform.eu.
2 We acknowledge that the preference for the more passive design options is sensitive to
the availability of scientific evidence. For example, a passive attitude can be connected
to the fact that tools for mitigating misinformation are new to users. Therefore, users
might have vague and unclear associations about the features of such tools
(Uekermann et al., 2010; Svahn and Lange, 2009).
3 A description of the technical details of the evaluation procedures is beyond the scope
of this paper, but a more in-depth explanation of them is provided in Danielson and
Ekenberg (2019).
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